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John Rawls and other contract theorists have been criticized for 
excluding people with severe cognitive disabilities from the scope 
of justice. I argue that this criticism is unfounded. I claim instead 
it would be irrational for parties to a Rawlsian social contract to 
exclude the interests of those with severe cognitive disabilities. 
Throughout his theory of justice, Rawls assumes "persons are 
normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete 
life, and so have the requisite capacities for assuming that role" (Polit-
ical 21). He acknowledges "there is the question of what is owed to 
those who fail to meet this condition, either temporarily (from ill-
ness and accident) or permanently" (Political 21). His answer is that 
he "very much doubts" whether it is possible to answer this question 
within the scope of justice as fairness. Rawls suggests three alterna-
tive responses to the problems on which justice as fairness may fail. 
One possible response is this: "perhaps we simply lack the ingenu-
ity to see how the extension may proceed" (Political 21). Second, it's 
possible that "the idea of political justice does not cover everything, 
nor should we expect it to". Giving this response would imply that 
the treatment of people with cognitive disabilities is not a matter 
of justice, but rather a matter of charity or compassion. Third, "the 
problem may indeed be one of political justice but justice as fairness 
is not correct in this case, however well it may do for other cases. 
How deep a fault this is must wait until the case itself can be exam-
ined". This last response implies that Rawls's conception of justice as 
fairness is indeed intended to cover all cases, but turns out to need 
amendment as it pertains to certain cases. 
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Martha Nussbaum investigates this third possibility. She argues 
that if people with cognitive disabilities aren't considered in choos-
ing the basic principles of justice, then Rawls's theory is incomplete 
and deeply flawed, and should therefore be rejected in favor of the 
capabilities account. Nussbaum claims "the case of the mentally 
disabled proves very revealing for the entire structure of Rawls's 
contract doctrine, and, more generally, for the project of basing 
principles of justice on reciprocity between rough equals who are 
imagined as joining together to reap a mutual benefit" (Capabilities 
32). Nussbaum interprets Rawls as "judging that there is no plausible 
solution to the problem of the mentally disabled that we can extract 
from his initial bargaining situation" (Capabilities 32). 
Indeed, there is textual evidence for the view that questions con-
cerning people with cognitive disabilities are not to be addressed 
while choosing the principles of justice. In Political Liberalism Rawls 
states: 
Since we begin from the idea of society as a fair system of 
cooperation, we assume that persons as citizens have all 
the capacities that enable them to be cooperating members 
of society. This is done to achieve a clear and uncluttered 
view of what, for us, is the fundamental question of politi-
cal justice: namely, what is the most appropriate concep-
tion of justice for specifying the terms of social cooperation 
between citizens regarded as free and equal, and as normal 
and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life? 
By taking this as the fundamental question we do not mean to 
say, of course, that no one ever suffers from illness and accident; 
such misfortunes are to be expected in the ordinary course of 
life, and provision for these contingencies must be made. But 
given our aim, / put aside for the time being these temporary disabili-
ties and also permanent disabilities or mental disorders so severe as to 
prevent people from being cooperating members of society in the usual 
sense (Political 20). 
Nussbaum interprets Rawls in this passage as postponing all con-
sideration of people with cognitive disabilities to the legislative stage 
of his theory (Capabilities 16). If Nussbaum's pessimistic reading is 
correct, then people with cognitive disabilities cannot be considered 
during the deliberations in the original position (the initial bargain-
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ing situation in which the social contract is negotiated). If at the ini-
tial stage the basic principles do not apply to people with cognitive 
disabilities, then we must invoke some separate set of principles to 
deal with their interests later, at the legislative stage. Nussbaum finds 
this strategy unacceptable for a political theory like Rawls' doctrine, 
which "explicitly aims at completeness and finality."1 For a political 
theory to offer a complete account, she argues, "it is not open to us 
to say: we have done one part of [the] task [of designing the basic 
structure of society], but of course other parts, equally basic, based 
on completely different principles, will come along later" (Nuss-
baum, Frontiers 139). 
I agree with Nussbaum that any theory of justice needs to think 
about the problem from the beginning, in the design of the most 
basic level of institutions (Capabilities 26). However, rather than giv-
ing up on contractualism, I aim to provide a revised version of Raw-
Isian contract theory that need not be rejected as being incomplete 
and deeply flawed. 
My argument has four parts. Part One, Drawing the Line, responds 
to Nussbaum's charge that Rawls's theory is flawed because it fails 
to consider people with cognitive disabilities in choosing the basic 
principles of justice. I defend a reading of Rawls in which the inter-
ests of people with severe cognitive disabilities are represented at the 
initial stage of choosing the basic principles. In Part Two, Drawing 
a New Circle, I argue the description of the parties in the original 
position requires Rawlsians to distinguish between actual cognitive 
functioning and merely potential cognitive functioning. Thus, it is 
rational for parties in the original position to choose principles of 
justice that apply to all moral persons, including those who happen 
to have merely potential cognitive functioning. 
In Part Three, I revise the Rawlsian theory by adding a Princi-
ple of Need, which specifies the extent to which the basic structure 
is required to redress inequalities in access to the conditions that 
enable individuals to develop their potential for cognitive function-
1 See for example A Theory of Justice 135, where finality is a formal condition 
on political principles, and 175-8, in the argument for the two principles where 
it is made clear that the agreement "is final and made in perpetuity" and that 
"there is no second chance" (176) . 
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ing. In Part Four, I discuss the main objection to the Principle of 
Need, that it does not provide a principled basis for limiting our 
obligations to people with cognitive disabilities. I end by providing a 
Rawlsian response to this Bottomless Pit Problem. 
Part One—Drawing the Line: Minimal Conditions 
for Equal Just ice 
Rawls makes a sharp distinction between variations in moral and 
intellectual capacities and skills that place people above or below a 
line as shown in Figure 1. This line represents the threshold at which 
people have "the minimum essential capacities required to be nor-
mal cooperating members of society" (Political, 183). Justice as fair-
ness applies only to free and equal persons, meaning persons who 
are above this line. What characterizes people above this line? They 
must possess two moral powers: the capacity for a sense of justice 
and the capacity for a conception of the good. These two moral pow-
ers specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for being counted 
a full and equal member of society in questions of political justice 
(Rawls, Liberties 16). The capacity for a sense ofjustice is 
. . . the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the 
public conception of justice which characterizes the fair terms 
of cooperation. Given the nature of the political conception as 
specifying a public basis of justification, a sense of justice also 
expresses a willingness, if not the desire, to act in relation to 
others on terms that they also can publicly endorse . . . (Rawls, 
Political 19) 
The second moral power, the capacity for a conception of the good, 
is "the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a concep-
tion of one's rational advantage or good" (Rawls, Political 19). 
Persons (Individuals with BOTH the capacity for a sense of justice 
and the capacity for a conception of the good) 
Non-Persons (Individuals with NEITHER of the above capacities) 
Figure 1: The Personhood Line 
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When it comes to the two moral powers, there is admittedly much 
variation among individuals. However, according to the conception 
of justice as fairness, when the two principles of justice are satisfied, 
none of the variations among individuals above the line should give 
rise to injustice. In other words, these variations should not affect 
the rights and duties (or the benefits and burdens) assigned to indi-
viduals. For example, someone very passionate about doing political 
philosophy that has developed a highly enhanced sense of justice is 
not therefore entitled to a larger share of the basic liberties. Con-
versely, someone with a minimal understanding of Rawls's concep-
tion of justice is entitled to the same moral consideration as every-
one else. What matters is whether someone has the two moral powers; 
any scalar variations above the line make no difference. Rawls writes, 
"While individuals presumably have varying capacities for a sense 
of justice, this fact is not a reason for depriving those with a lesser 
capacity of the full protection of justice. Once a certain minimum is 
met, a person is entitled to equal liberty on a par with everyone else" 
(Justice 443). 
The following passage introduces Rawls's idea of a range prop-
erty. He uses the example of a circle to illustrate his point. The 
property of being inside a circle is a range property of points in the 
plane. All points inside this circle have this property, although their 
coordinates vary within a certain range. Each of these points has this 
property to an equal extent, since no point inside a circle is more 
or less inside it than any other interior point (Rawls, Justice 444) . 
Jeremy Waldron discusses the analogous case of state boundaries. 
He invites us to 
. . . consider the characteristic which a municipality might have 
of being in New Jersey . . . Though Princeton is in central New 
Jersey, well away from the state line, and Hoboken just over the 
river from New York, they are both in New Jersey to the same 
extent, so far as the law is concerned. One could point to a sca-
lar geographical difference between them; but jurisdictionally it 
is irrelevant. Being in New Jersey, then, is a range property, rang-
ing over all the points within the boundaries of the state (48-49). 
Thus, when it comes to "minimal conditions for moral consid-
eration," Rawls draws the line between those with the capacity for 
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a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good on 
the one hand, and those who completely lack the capacity for moral 
personality on the other. Note that Rawls distinguishes carefully 
between a being's capacity, meaning potential, and the realization of 
that potential. 
1 have said that the minimal requirements defining moral 
personality refer to a capacity and not to the realization of it. 
A being that has this capacity, whether or not it is yet developed, 
is to receive the full protection of the principles of justice. 
Since infants and children are thought to have basic rights 
(normally exercised on their behalf by parents and guard-
ians), this interpretation of the requisite conditions seems 
necessary to match our considered judgments. Moreover, 
regarding the potentiality as sufficient accords with the hypo-
thetical nature of the original position, and with the idea that 
as far as possible the choice of principles should not be influenced 
by arbitrary contingencies. Therefore it is reasonable to say that 
those who could take part in the initial agreement, were it not 
for fortuitous circumstances, are assured equal justice (Justice 
445-446). 
Rawls imagines the contractors as a small group negotiating on 
behalf of a wider class of individuals, including those who possess the 
two moral powers only potentially. He emphasizes "while individu-
als presumably have varying capacities for a sense of justice, this fact 
is not a reason for depriving those with a lesser capacity of the full 
protection of justice" (Justice 443). 
Contrary to popular misconceptions, many people initially diag-
nosed as having "severe" cognitive disabilities have the potential for 
developing a sense of justice and a conception of the good, given the 
right circumstances. There are many examples of individuals who 
have developed moral powers well beyond what was expected of 
them, thanks to their families' support and advocacy for their inclu-
sion in mainstream education, in the arts, and in politics. Only forty 
years ago, doctors predicted that infants born with Down syndrome 
would never learn to walk, talk, or dress themselves.2 Because some 
2 An interesting tale is told by longevity statistics. There are severe racial 
and socioeconomic disparities in the longevity of people with Down syndrome 
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families refused to institutionalize their children, instead choosing 
to raise them along with their non-disabled siblings, there are many 
adults with Down syndrome who have become flourishing members 
of society. Chris Burke became the first actor with Down syndrome 
to act in a TV series in the United States and has published his auto-
biography, A Special Kind of Hero. In Count Us In: Growing Up with 
Down Syndrome, Jason Kingsley discusses completing high school, vol-
unteering for a U.S. Senator and hoping to run for office. According 
to his web site, Sujeet Desai has a black belt in Tae Kwon Do, plays 
the clarinet, the piano, and the violin, and married Carrie Bergeron 
in 2006. The couple now lives together with support from their fami-
lies and staff.3 
The " H a r d Cases" Objection 
It may appear that I have selectively provided examples of seem-
ingly profound impairments where appropriate conditions allow 
for development of the moral powers. Although there are many 
success stories, surely there are also many individuals who reach 
the higher limits of their potential before acquiring the two moral 
powers. Admittedly, in certain cases this potential, ordinarily real-
ized in due course, is never actually realized during the lifetime of 
a given individual. Nussbaum claims that people with severe mental 
impairments are described in Rawls's theory as "scattered individu-
als" who, lacking the moral capacities to some essential minimum 
degree, fail to qualify for equality (Frontiers 65). What I call the Hard 
(DS). Whites with DS now live until the average age of 50, but the life expec-
tancy for blacks is 25 and "others" 11, according to a recent study conducted 
at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. This means that white indi-
viduals with DS live twice as long as blacks and four times as long as Asians, 
Hispanics, and Native Americans with the very same condition. When compar-
ing the life expectancy of whites and blacks in the same socioeconomic class 
the disparities are not nearly so great, indicating that the causal factors are class 
and social standing, not the genetic features of racial difference. These statisti-
cal variations support the view that a person's longevity, far from being strictly 
determined by the genetic condition of Down syndrome, is linked to social and 
economic factors that can be influenced by policy changes. 
3 See Sujeet Desai, Personal Web page at www.sujeet.com; also Claudia 
Wallis, "A Very Special Wedding," Time Magazine, Sunday, July 16, 2 0 0 6 . 
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Cases Objection is that even though Rawls may be able to include 
individuals labeled mildly or moderately retarded, he cannot include 
the severely retarded, meaning that group of individuals who are so 
severely disabled as to be beyond hope of ever developing the two 
moral powers. 
My response to the Hard Cases Objection is as follows. Terms 
such as "mildly," "severely" or "profoundly" retarded do not refer to 
natural kinds, but rather to socially constructed categories that are 
highly unstable, as Licia Carlson has shown in her work. 4 Determin-
ing which individuals are labeled as severely retarded varies depend-
ing on historical period, race, and socio-economic status.5 Bearing 
this in mind, we should not let these labels distort our thinking about 
the individuals in the category and their diverse abilities and capaci-
ties. Indeed, the moral capacities demonstrated by any given indi-
vidual are crucially influenced by the current state of scientific, edu-
cational and medical knowledge. For example, some individuals with 
hearing impairments were thought to be retarded and were denied 
educational opportunities because they did not communicate suc-
cessfully with those who diagnosed them. Given the thousands of 
cases of misdiagnoses so far, scientific knowledge about mental dis-
abilities is highly unreliable. 
Furthermore, we must examine the assumptions and methodolo-
gies used by those who are attempting to determine the presence 
or absence of moral capacities. Consider the astonishing progress 
made by people diagnosed on the autism spectrum as an example. 
Less than fifteen years ago, Nick Pentzell was initially diagnosed as 
"profoundly retarded" and was thought to be completely nonverbal. 
Because his family members continued to search for ways to com-
municate with him, he learned the technique of facilitated commu-
nication at the age of thirteen. He has since written college-level 
4 See Licia Carlson, "Cognitive Ableism and Disability Studies: Feminist 
Reflections on the History of Mental Retardation". (Hypatia 16:4 ( 2 0 0 1 ) : 
124-46.) See also Carlson, Mindful Subjects: Classification and Cognitive Disability. 
Ottawa: National Library of Canada, 1999. 
5 For example, a disproportionate number of black students are labeled 
"retarded" and placed in classrooms where they receive less attention from 
teachers, while a disproportionate number of white students are labeled "learn-
ing disabled" and given extra tutoring and support for their academic studies. 
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papers demonstrating that he certainly possesses the capacities that 
Rawls describes.6 Stories like Pentzell's demonstrate that the label 
profoundly retarded may lead to neglect and wrongful treatment 
of individuals who might learn and develop their capacities if they 
received the necessary care and attention. They also demonstrate 
that the severity of a person's disability can be socially constructed 
through the failure to develop technologies such as hearing aids, sign 
language and facilitated communication. Given my reading of Rawls, 
all humans with the potential for moral personality, including people 
believed to have severe cognitive disabilities, do fall within the scope 
of justice. 
Part Two—Drawing a New Circle 
Nussbaum would not be satisfied with this reply, however, because 
I still have not shown how those who have severe cognitive disabilities 
could participate in the initial bargaining situation. In Nussbaum's 
description of social contract theory, the underlying picture is that 
each of the bargaining parties is "a productive individual who will be 
willing to sacrifice some prerogatives in order to reap the rewards of 
mutual cooperation (Frontiers 34). 
On Nussbaum's reading, there is presumably no place for infants 
and children at the bargaining table, according to social contract 
theorists. Barring the possibility of child labor, how can children be 
construed as having "normal" productive capacities comparable to 
those of adults? However, in the passage from Rawls cited above, he 
does make room for infants and children. He states that those who 
"could take part in the initial agreement, were it not for fortuitous cir-
cumstances, are assured equal justice" (Justice 446). 
What is the best way to make sense of Rawls's view here? I pro-
pose a second line to be drawn, which distinguishes between those 
6 N i c k Pentzell, "I think, therefore I am. I am verbal, therefore I live." 
Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Disability Studies on June 
15, 2 0 0 6 . See also Jenn Seybert, "Inclusion . . . Finally!" (Keynote address to the 
Maryland Coalition for Inclusive Education, Baltimore, 2 0 0 2 ) , in Sharing Our 
Wisdom: A Collection of Presentations by People within the Autism Spectrum, eds. Gail 
Gillingham and Sandra McClennen (Autism National Committee, 2 0 0 3 ) . This 
book is available through the website www.autcom.org. 
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who have the unrealized potential to be fully cooperating members 
of society, and those who are actually exercising their capacities for a 
sense of justice and a conception of the good. In Figure 2, I've drawn 
this line as a circle to indicate that it is a range property. The circle 
is a dotted line rather than a solid line because the border between 
potential and actual functioning can be crossed in either direction 
at any time. I define the term actual cognitive functioning as the exercise 
of one's capacity for a sense of justice and capacity for a conception 
of the good. 
In contrast, the term merely potential cognitive functioning 
describes those who are outside the circle at a given point in time. 
This group includes all infants and very young children, as well as 
adults with the following conditions: severe mental retardation, some 
psychiatric disorders, some degenerative diseases such as Alzheim-
er's, and persistent vegetative states. 
X * " ~ X 
i Actual cognitive ^ w Merely potential 
• functioning ^ ' ^ cognitive functioning 
V — * 
Non-persons (beings lacking the capacity for moral personality) 
Figure 2: The Dotted Circle and the Line 
Let me make some remarks about the boundary between actual 
and merely potential cognitive functioning. First, notice that at 
any given point in time, a person's position relative to the circle is 
wholly contingent. Over the course of a complete lifetime, the aver-
age human being crosses the dotted line at least once, in many cases 
twice. We are all born outside the circle, with merely potential cog-
nitive functioning. With attentive parenting and access to education, 
most of us eventually cross the line into the circle at some point 
during childhood development. The arbitrariness of this crossing 
becomes evident when we think of the many physical conditions that 
were historically assumed to place people irrevocably outside the 
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circle. 7 However, largely due to vast improvements in medical tech-
nology and educational innovation, several individuals with these 
conditions have developed actual cognitive functioning and entered 
into the circle. Many of us, once inside the circle, cross back outside 
temporarily or permanently due to disease, accident, and ageing. 
Lastly, there are a few individuals who start outside the circle and 
never move inside. Although these individuals never actualized their 
potential, they still belong above the line and are to be distinguished 
from those who lack the brain stem or other organs necessary for 
cognitive functioning. 
Given these facts about the conditions of human life, I assert two 
premises, which are represented by the arrows in Figure 2. Accord-
ing to the Vulnerability Premise (the arrow pointing right): Anyone 
can/could have merely potential cognitive functioning. In other words, it 
is always possible to cross the line outwards, moving outside of the 
circle. According to the Developmental Premise (the arrow pointing 
left): Many can/could develop actual cognitive functioning. In many cases, 
but perhaps not all, it is possible to cross the line into the circle. 
Given both these premises, it is impossible to label particular 
concrete individuals permanently inside (actual cognitive function-
ing) or outside (merely potential cognitive functioning). Consider 
an analogy with income level. The poverty line is an arbitrary line set 
by policy makers in order to measure economic well-being. The indi-
viduals who live below the poverty line cannot be identified by name, 
because every year some people manage to acquire more income 
and move above the poverty line, while others lose their jobs and 
fall below. Any one of us through misfortune, natural disaster, or 
accident can fall below the poverty line, and it is to be hoped that 
even for those born into poverty, rising above the poverty line is also 
possible (although difficult and unlikely) within one lifetime. 
'Examples include Down syndrome and autism. Note also that in some 
historical contexts, slaves and women were considered irreparably deficient 
in cognitive functioning due to biological causes. To the extent that slaves and 
women were considered non-persons, they were classified as "below the line" 
in Figure 1, but my point is that they were actually above the line; because they 
were not given opportunities to demonstrate their cognitive functions, they 
were placed outside the circle of Figure 2. 
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Just as there is no fixed group of people known as "those below 
the poverty line," there is no particular group of people who fall 
inside the circle of those who enjoy actual cognitive functioning. In 
other words, there are no persons who are permanently nondisabled. 
Any one of us through misfortune, natural disaster, or accident can 
lose our cognitive functioning in an instant. Similarly, we cannot 
identify individuals who are perpetually in a state of merely potential 
cognitive functioning. Acquiring cognitive functioning is a complex 
and lengthy process that requires resources, attention, and care. 8 
Notice that the circle doesn't divide persons, but rather time-
slices of persons. The natural life-cycle of a typical human being 
starts with time-slices of merely potential functioning, proceeds to 
time-slices of actual functioning, and may revert to merely potential 
functioning at any time, particularly near the end of life. If we tried 
to divide individuals into groups, we'd have to distinguish those who 
always, sometimes and never have actual cognitive functioning. Unlike 
the Greek goddess Athena, who sprang fully-grown and armored 
from the head of Zeus, no human being always has actual cognitive 
functioning over a complete lifetime. Most of us fall into the cat-
egory of sometimes, and a very small minority never. 
Returning to the "Hard Cases" objection, let us now consider 
how Rawls's position might account for those who never make the 
transition from potential cognitive functioning to actual cognitive 
functioning. It should be noted that strictly speaking, most individu-
als in persistent vegetative states (PVS) fall into the sometimes category 
(rather than never), because they had cognitive functioning at earlier 
stages of life.9 Furthermore, misdiagnosis of PVS is not uncommon. 
One study has reported that 43% of those patients classified as in a 
PVS were misdiagnosed and another 33% were able to recover con-
sciousness while the study was underway (Andrews 13-16). As for 
8 1 have written elsewhere about the Enabling Conditions for acquiring 
moral capacities. See "The Moral Personhood of Individuals Labeled "Mentally 
Retarded": A Rawlsian Response to Nussbaum," in Social Theory and Practice, 
forthcoming. 
9 In the US, it is estimated that there may be between 15,000-40,000 
patients who are in a persistent vegetative state, but due to poor nursing home 
records exact figures are hard to determine. Cf. Joy Hirsch, "Raising conscious-
ness," The Journal of Clinical Investigation, 115(5): 1102, May 2005 . 
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the small remainder of individuals who never regain consciousness 
within their lifetimes, this stipulation can only be made once the 
individual's life has ended. As long as someone is still alive, one can 
never give the following description: "since going into a PVS, this 
person never regained the ability to exercise the two moral powers 
during his or her complete lifetime." 
For dealing with individuals in a PVS, there are two approaches 
for Rawlsians. The first approach is to stipulate that such human 
beings should lose their claims to moral personhood after some arbi-
trary period of time in which they fail to demonstrate actual cog-
nitive functioning. This is the approach taken by most hospitals, in 
which medical treatment is withdrawn from patients who remain 
unresponsive after thirty days.10 
The second approach would be to continue to count these indi-
viduals as moral persons until the end of their lives, even if they never 
regain consciousness. This was the approach taken by the family of 
Michelle Martone, who was almost killed in February 1998 when 
she was struck by a car while waiting for a bus in front of her dorm. 
Unconscious, she was moved from rehabilitation program to pro-
gram, each time being discharged because she did not make sufficient 
progress during the time allotted. Because her parents persisted in 
continuing to find treatment for her, Martone began to emerge from 
the vegetative state seven months after the initial injury. After sev-
eral months, it was determined she had plateaued and that any more 
progress was unlikely. In November of 1999, her parents brought her 
home to live with them, where she continues to receive therapy, has 
twenty-four hour nursing care, and is making remarkable progress." 
The advantage of taking the second approach to individuals in PVS 
is that they sometimes recover long after medical professionals have 
predicted they are incapable of making any further progress. 
So how does this new circle affect the deliberations concern-
ing the principles of justice? For Rawls, the parties in the original 
position: 
1 0 See Marilyn Martone, "Decisionmaking Issues in the Rehabilitation Pro-
cess," The Hastings Center Report vol. 31, 2001. 
" According to her blog, Martone is learning to speak and to walk again 
and has regained most of her long-term memory. See michellemartone.net. 
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. . . know that they are subject to the conditions of human life. 
Being in the circumstances of justice, they are situated in the 
world with other men who likewise face limitations of moderate 
scarcity and competing claims. Human freedom is to be regu-
lated by principles chosen in the light of these natural restric-
tions. Thus justice as fairness is a theory of human justice and 
among its premises are the elementary facts about persons and 
their place in nature. The freedom of pure intelligences not sub-
ject to these constraints, and the freedom of God, are outside 
the scope of the theory (Justice 226). 
I argue that natural variation in cognitive functioning is precisely 
one of these "elementary facts about persons", one of the "condi-
tions of human life." Since Rawls is offering us a theory of justice for 
humans, then it is highly relevant that human intelligence is affected 
and constrained by myriad natural contingencies. Thus, the Vulnerabil-
ity Premise and the Developmental Premise are precisely the kinds of 
"elementary facts about persons and their place in nature" that parties 
in the original position should know about and take into consideration. 
Therefore I can now articulate my original claim (people with 
cognitive disabilities fall under the scope of justice) in much more 
precise terms. I will call this the Inclusive Claim: It would be irrational for 
self-interested individuals in states of actual cognitive functioning to choose 
basic principles ofjustice that exclude individuals in states of merely potential 
cognitive functioning. If the Inclusive Claim is true, then parties in the 
original position will know they represent not only healthy compe-
tent adults, but also infants and children, as well as others who have 
merely potential cognitive functioning. Returning to the economic 
analogy, imagine parties in the original position stipulating there is a 
certain minimum income that people need in order to be cooperat-
ing members of society. Imagine further that the parties recognize 
that sometimes people fail to obtain that minimum income because 
of elementary economic facts. Someone then suggests the following 
basic principle: that whenever one falls below that minimum income 
level, one is no longer an equal member of society and unable to 
make claims of justice. It would clearly be irrational for self-inter-
ested individuals to choose such a principle of justice, knowing full 
well they themselves might experience periods of poverty below the 
minimum income level due to circumstances beyond their control. 
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The Inclusive Claim refutes Nussbaum's criticism because it 
shows that the logic of the bargaining situation does not require the 
bargainers to think of themselves as always having "normal" produc-
tive capacities. Rather, those who currently have actual cognitive 
functioning negotiate a contract on behalf of themselves in all their 
possible states and time-slices. Having established who is included in 
the original position, my next task is to examine how the principles 
chosen in the original position are applied in Rawls's theory. 
Part Three—The Principle o f Need 
Recall that in Political Liberalism, Rawls summarizes his concep-
tion of "justice as fairness" by stating the two basic principles of jus-
tice as follows: 
1. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of 
liberties for all. 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. 
First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they 
must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members 
of society (Political 291). 
In discussing the first principle of justice, Rawls states: 
. . . the first principle covering the equal basic rights and liber-
ties may easily be preceded by a lexically prior principle requir-
ing that citizens' basic needs be met, at least insofar as their 
being met is necessary for citizens to understand and to be able 
fruitfully to exercise those rights and liberties. Certainly any 
such principle must be assumed in applying the first principle 
(Political 7). 
What are these basic needs? Presumably Rawls is referring to 
things like adequate food and shelter, which are prerequisites for 
exercising one's rights and liberties. What is necessary to understand 
the rights and liberties that are distributed by the first principle? I 
would argue that actual cognitive functioning is necessary and that it 
should therefore also count as a basic need. Just as each person has a 
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claim to adequate shelter and food, so does each person with poten-
tial cognitive functioning have a claim to the resources required to 
attain actual cognitive functioning. I shall call these resources the 
"Enabling Conditions" for acquiring actual cognitive functioning.1 2 
Let me now formulate a provisional principle following Rawls's 
proposal. Call it the Principle of Need: the basic structure should provide 
all citizens with access to the Enabling Conditions necessary for develop-
ing the capacities required to understand and exercise the basic rights and 
liberties. Because it is lexically prior to the first principle, those who 
design the basic structure must ensure that the Principle of Need is 
fulfilled before the equal liberties and other benefits of social coop-
eration are distributed. 
Because the Principle of Need must be fulfilled before the First 
and Second Principles are considered, inequalities in the distribu-
tion of food, shelter, and education would be considered graver 
injustices than other social and economic inequalities such as dif-
ferences in voting rights, income, or the social bases of self-respect. 
Thus it becomes clear when we distribute the fruits of social coop-
eration, it is important to devote resources to helping those with 
merely potential cognitive functioning approach and attain actual 
cognitive functioning. This is certainly a compelling claim on behalf 
of people with severe cognitive disabilities. Without the Principle 
of Need, it appears that persons who have never achieved cognitive 
functioning have no claim to the Enabling Conditions. For exam-
ple, it would be permissible to house non-verbal individuals (who 
have been labeled as severely retarded) in institutions where they 
interact only with caregivers who fulfill their basic physical needs, 
without any opportunities to develop their cognitive abilities. Once 
1 2 When Rawls construes the two moral powers as potential properties, he 
is asserting that a given individual will develop a conception of the good and a 
sense of justice under certain circumstances that may or may not obtain in the 
future. These specific circumstances are what I call the Enabling Conditions. A 
dry seed may lie for years in darkness, but then start to germinate under condi-
tions providing moisture, sunlight and nutrients. The Enabling Conditions for 
the development of a plant are the humidity of the soil, the presence of light, 
and certain fertilizing nutrients. Similarly, certain human beings may show no 
signs of having a sense of justice but will gradually develop a sense of justice 
when they encounter the appropriate Enabling Conditions. 
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someone suddenly demonstrates increased cognitive functioning, 
that individual would be accorded the rights of Rawlsian persons. By 
contrast, adding the Principle of Need to the theory ensures that all 
individuals have access to the Enabling Conditions even before they 
have demonstrated cognitive functioning. 
Although the proposal to add the Principle of Need gives rise to 
some reasonable objections, I have shown elsewhere that this claim 
can be defended in a way that is consistent with Rawlsian assump-
tions. 1 3 Appealing to the Principle of Need may provide grounds 
for arguing that PCDs have rights to the Enabling Conditions, and 
that these rights belong with the other basic rights and liberties that 
Rawls has outlined. Such an argument would require first showing 
how Rawls's theory can be interpreted as a rights-based theory, then 
arguing that the Enabling Conditions are best viewed as rights held 
by people who have the potential to acquire the two moral powers. 
Rawlsians would then have to find some way of establishing a rank-
ing among the rights of individuals. This is a position I have defended 
elsewhere in detail.1 4 For the purposes of the current discussion, how-
ever, I will focus on assessing the Principle of Need to see whether it 
can withstand objections. 
Part Four—The "Bot tomless Pi t" Problem 
The main objection to the Principle of Need is that it does not 
provide a principled basis for limiting our obligations to people 
with cognitive disabilities. The Developmental Premise (that people 
can move from outside to the inside of the circle) holds plausibly 
enough for "normal" infants and children. But when we consider 
people with severe cognitive disabilities, the facts suggest many of 
these individuals will never attain actual cognitive functioning, even 
if unlimited resources are expended. Does the Principle of Need 
generate a duty of justice that cannot be fulfilled? In other words, 
1 3 For example, one of the problems with adding the Principle of Need is 
that it complicates the determination of the least advantaged group. I discuss 
these problems further in my dissertation ("Rawlsian Contractualism and Cog-
nitive Disabilities," Columbia University, 2 0 0 6 ) . 
1 4 See "Rights for People with Cognitive Disabilities," (currently under 
review with another journal). 
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does it require society to exhaust its resources trying to help people 
who may never attain actual cognitive functioning? When resources 
are scarce, it would appear there is no principled way of limit-
ing the demands of the Principle of Need. Reforms of an existing 
unjust institutional scheme would focus on equalizing access to the 
Enabling Conditions so people can develop the two moral powers, at 
the expense of tolerating other kinds of injustices, such as inequali-
ties in voting rights, income, or the social bases of self-respect. I call 
this the "Bottomless Pit" Problem. And it is troubling indeed, at first 
glance. 
Let me point out that this objection relies crucially on a com-
mitment to two premises. The first is an empirical premise. It con-
cerns the probability of success, where we stipulate that resources have 
been successfully distributed when an individual crosses the thresh-
old from potential to actual cognitive functioning. The various ver-
sions of this premise can be represented by locating them as points 
along the vertical axis of a graph as shown in Figure 3. The objection 
relies on the empirical premise that the probability of success is very 
low. Note that this empirical premise is in turn dependent on an 
epistemic claim about the facts. One's knowledge of the facts might 
range from approaching certainty—perhaps based on centuries of 
scientific studies—to approaching utter uncertainty due to a small 
sample, an unprecedented case, or general lack of data. 
John Stuart Mill famously argued in 1869 that the current state 
of knowledge about women's potential functioning was inadequate 
for making epistemic claims, writing: "I consider it a presumption 
in any one to pretend to decide what women are or are not, can or 
cannot be, by natural constitution. They have always hitherto been 
kept, as far as regards spontaneous development, in so unnatural a 
state, that their nature cannot but have been greatly distorted and 
disguised" (219). Attempting to assess the potential of women judg-
ing from their state in nineteenth-century England (or the potential 
of people who have spent their early childhoods in institutions with 
inadequate care) is like measuring the stunted growth of plants kept 
in restrictive containers, deprived of light and space. As long as the 
epistemic enabling conditions (allowing spontaneous development) 
do not obtain, we cannot make any knowledge claims concerning 
the peculiar tendencies and aptitudes characteristic of women. It 
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has been argued elsewhere that our current knowledge about people 
with cognitive disabilities is similarly lacking.15 
The second dimension of this problem involves one's basic assump-
tions about resources. This is represented by the horizontal axis of the 
graph. Game-theoretic assumptions about resources range from the 
classic zero-sum view, in which giving to one means taking from 
another, to the cooperative view, in which many benefit at the same 
time from the same resources. We make different assumptions along 
this axis concerning various kinds of resources, depending whether 
the goods can be divided among many or used by only one person at 
a time. For example, when it comes to food, giving some to one per-
son necessarily means less for others. The same goes for organ trans-
plants. On the other hand, certain resources can be shared coopera-
tively. For example, if one person takes music lessons, she can bring 
others to the lesson so they can learn about music at the same time 
by listening and observing. The teacher also benefits from the lesson, 
because she enhances her skill in teaching, and may further use the 
lesson as an opportunity to train apprentice teachers, who also ben-
efit from observing the lesson. 
Looking at the intersection of the two axes, we see that possible 
applications of the Principle of Need can be roughly divided into 
four groups, one in each quadrant of the graph. The Bottomless Pit 
Problem clearly belongs in the lower left-hand quadrant, where we 
assume 1) the probability of success is very low, hence these cases 
will create "bottomless pits"; and 2) any amount of resource allo-
cated to one individual reduces the amount available for others to 
use. These two assumptions characterize the kind of views exten-
sively discussed in the literature on Lifeboat Ethics. These views 
typically focus on life-or-death scenarios involving scarce resources. 
Examples include setting priorities in eligibility for organ transplants 
or dialysis machines, end-of-life issues, and triage in emergency care. 
Usually the guidelines for distributing resources involve prioritizing 
the most urgent needs and focusing on the candidates with the best 
prospects for recovery or success. If the vast majority of people with 
merely potential cognitive functioning had very poor prospects of 
1 5 See for example Sophia Isako Wong, "At Home with Down Syndrome 
and Gender," Hypatia 17:3 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , 89-117. 
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achieving actual cognitive functioning and most of their needs were 
for critical health care, then perhaps this model would serve well 
enough to cover most cases. 
However, notice that in many cases, there are high probabilities 
of success in helping someone achieve actual cognitive functioning. 
The average infant, for example, usually achieves actual cognitive 
functioning given attentive parenting and access to basic education. 
While continuing to assume the zero-sum view of resources, if we 
change the other assumption and judge that the probability of suc-
cess is high, then we end up with the model in the upper left-hand 
quadrant of Figure 3.1 call this model Betting on the Underdog because 
it is characterized by a certain amount of strategic risk-taking. In 
the case of the typical infant, parents usually assume the resources 
invested will result in success, and that the investment is worthwhile, 
sometimes even if paying for better childcare requires financial sac-
rifices on the part of the whole family. 
Assuming High Probability of Success 
"BETTING ON THE UNDERDOG" 
• Prospects are promising 
• Giving to one takes away 
from others 
Zero-Sum View 
of Resources 
LIFEBOAT ETHICS 
• Prospects are poor 
• Giving to one takes 
away from others 
"QUEENING THE PAWN" 
• Prospects are promising 
• Resources benefit many 
at the same time 
Cooperative View 
of Resources 
"TENDING THE GARDEN" 
• Prospects are poor 
• Resources benefit many 
at the same time 
Assuming Low Probability of Success 
Figure 3: Four Applications of the Principle of Need 
I'll briefly describe the remaining two quadrants. Taking the 
cooperative view of resources, while assuming that the prospects of 
success are poor gives us what I call the Tending the Garden model, 
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in the lower right-hand quadrant. On this model, imagine two pes-
simistic urban apartment-dwellers who plant tomato seeds in a pot 
on their north-facing windowsill. They know the probability of suc-
cess is pretty low, but they still find it worthwhile to spend time and 
energy tending to the plants, for the intrinsic benefits of gardening. 
The plants in turn benefit from the resource expended on them. This 
model may be appropriate for thinking about certain educational 
settings. It can be argued that creating a learning environment that 
includes students with cognitive disabilities is beneficial not only to 
those students, but also to their classmates, teachers and other staff 
in the school. For example, a building designed with special needs 
in mind may have clearly marked pathways that reduce stress and 
confusion, and colorful classrooms that make the visual environment 
more stimulating for all. The classrooms may include separate areas 
where students can work on different tasks, and those areas may be 
used to separate students into small groups throughout the day, not 
only while students with cognitive disabilities are in the room. 
Additionally, there might be moral reasons to treat all individu-
als on the assumption they have at least some prospect of achieving 
actual cognitive functioning, even if the statistics suggest that they 
probably won't do so. I argue that thinking of all persons as potential 
participants in society is one of the strengths of using a contractual-
ist model. Because contractualism encourages us to think of persons 
in an idealized way, we come to see everyone as essentially bearers 
of interests who are united in a system of reciprocal relationships. 
In order to pass the test of justice as fairness, the basic structure of 
society should be regulated by principles which would be chosen by 
contractors representing the interests of all members of society. Of 
course it is extremely difficult in practice to determine the interests 
of persons who do not (yet) speak for themselves. However, in assum-
ing that people with cognitive disabilities are on a path toward being 
able to express themselves, and to advocate for their own interests, 
theorists and public policy-makers alike are challenged to discover 
more about these people and what makes their lives go well. In try-
ing to set up structures that encourage people with merely potential 
cognitive functioning to move beyond non-reciprocal relationships 
of dependency, for example, we as competent adults are forced to 
re-examine our own assumptions about the meaning and value of 
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reciprocity and independence. Thus, in treating people who have not 
yet demonstrated cognitive functioning as though they will one day 
achieve actual functioning, I believe that we offer them the respect 
and dignity they deserve on a par with all other human beings. 
The fourth and final model in the upper right-hand quadrant 
assumes both that resources can be shared cooperatively, and that 
the prospects of success are high. Using an analogy from the game 
of chess, I call this model Queening the Pawn. Initially the pawn is not 
worth much, but in some cases it is rational to invest one's resources 
in protecting the pawn's movement across the board. Once it reaches 
the far side of the board and becomes a queen, that pawn will greatly 
enhance the resources available to the chess player and support the 
other pieces. Analogously, notice when people with merely potential 
cognitive functioning cross the threshold into the realm of actual 
cognitive functioning, the social rewards can be enormous and well 
worthwhile. Like "Tending the Garden," this model lends itself par-
ticularly well to educational settings. 
In summary, this two-dimensional framework provides guidelines 
for applying the Principle of Need to concrete cases of people with 
severe cognitive disabilities. I've described the models to give a very 
rough idea of the kind of thinking that will take place in applying the 
principle. We may not yet have enough information to decide which 
of the four models should be used to think about each specific case. 
I therefore argue that the Rawlsian theory as I have presented it calls 
for gathering empirical data about which individuals with severe cog-
nitive disabilities are likely to achieve actual cognitive functioning, 
given what kind of resources. 
So far the Bottomless Pit Problem remains: it would be fruitless 
for the theory to demand that society exhaust its resources in try-
ing to eliminate inequalities in access to the Enabling Conditions 
for acquiring actual cognitive functioning. In contextualizing the 
objection, I have contrasted the case of critical health care with basic 
education. In distributing scarce resources in critical health care, we 
invoke the zero-sum model, while in basic education we turn to a 
non-zero-sum, cooperative model of distribution on which society as 
a whole benefits from resources expended to ensure that everyone's 
basic needs are met. 
Cognitive Disabilities and the Scope of Contractualist justice 23 
Conclusion 
Let me end by offering a Rawlsian response to the Bottomless Pit 
Problem. Recall that Rawls opens A Theory of Justice by stating that 
the first virtue of social institutions is not efficiency, but justice (3-4). 
Creating a just society may well turn out to be shockingly expensive, 
but that is beside the point: The rights secured by justice are not 
subject to the calculus of social interests. Basic structures that dis-
tribute resources according to alternative theories may indeed pro-
duce higher economic growth rates and more profits for all to share. 
However, Rawls's goal is to articulate a vision of what justice as fair-
ness requires. He does acknowledge that coordination, efficiency, 
and stability are fundamental social problems that require some con-
sideration, but these are clearly secondary to his central problem of 
defining a conception of social justice (Justice 5-6). As Rawls puts it, 
a conception of social justice provides "a standard whereby the dis-
tributive aspects of the basic structure of society are to be assessed... 
Social arrangements may be efficient or inefficient, liberal or illib-
eral, and many other things, as well as just or unjust" (Justice 8-9). 
Whether a proposed conception of justice is feasible and easily 
implemented, then, must be assessed separately from its usefulness 
in showing whether existing societies are unjust, and if so, exactly 
how these injustices are to be ranked. If a given society does not 
give people with merely potential cognitive functioning a fair chance 
to develop actual cognitive functioning (which would enable them 
to press claims on their own behalf), then that is an injustice that 
takes precedence over inequalities among people who have already 
achieved the level of actual functioning that enables them to advo-
cate for their own interests. In the area of income inequality, wealthy 
members of society (who possess and are exercising the ability to 
create more income) may well balk at the prospect of distributing 
the benefits of social cooperation so that the poorest members of 
society, who are currently deprived, can fulfill all their basic needs. 
Even if the rich and powerful minority's resistance to change would 
cause significant political instability, Rawlsians are required to main-
tain the perspective that the status quo is unjust. 
The above Rawlsian response gives us good reason to consider 
revising the Rawlsian theory by adding the Principle of Need and 
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giving it lexical priority over the first two principles of justice. Jus-
tice as fairness cannot countenance a basic structure that fails to 
give members of society the opportunity to develop actual cognitive 
functioning, which is a necessary condition for enjoying the basic 
rights and liberties distributed by the first principle of justice. In this 
way, Rawlsian contractualist justice does indeed include people with 
cognitive disabilities within its scope. 1 6 
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